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SPECIAL FEATURES OF THE
LAST CYCLE
Summary
MOST of the distinguishing features of the last cycle
have already been indicated in the course of the dis-
cussion. There was the world-wide decline in prices,
the beginnings of which were visible before the
general decline in American business began, and
which continued and grew serious hand in hand
with the progress of the general business recession.
There was the behavior of our export trade, which
showed a strongly marked cycle in harmony with
our own, and which took the lead on the decline—
both features being peculiar to this cycle. There was
the concentration of expansion upon securities rather
than mainly upon goods, culminating in the mad
boom in the stock market and the resulting violent
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collapse, together with the continuance of the boom
past the peak of general business instead of taking
the lead on the down-turn, as usual. There was the
peculiar behavior of construction. There was the
depression Of agriculture which prevailed before the
general business recession and became deeper. There
was the attempt to sustain construction and capital
expansion by the method of conference and volun-
tary action—an attempt which did not prevent heavy
declines. There were the attempts to resist the de-
cline of money wage rates and to sustain the prices
of leading agricultural products by buying and hold-
ing the surplus. And there was the fiscal and mone-
tary crisis in various foreign countries, coming to a
head at a time when the depression had already gone
deeper and lasted longer than usual. There was an
unusual number of bank failures, becoming increas-
ingly prevalent and alarming as the depression length-
ened, and followed or accompanied by an unusual
tightening of bank credit and a wave of withdrawal
and hoarding of cash, against which a determined
campaign was launched, first by methods similar to
those first used in, the attempt to sustain capital
expenditures, and later by the Emergency Credit
Corporation and other tangible means.'
Another feature of the current cycle was the piling
up of unusually large stocks of several basic corn-
1Sincethe above was written the situation has been brought to a
head by the general banking suspension of March, 1933.
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modities, among which wheat and oil stood con-
spicuous but by no means alone. Ordinarily, literal
over-production as evidenced by the actual piling up
of stocks is a relatively small factor in the cycle, and
only appears after recession has set in. In this case,
there were some significant increases before the
down-turn in general business; and the stocks of a
number of basic materials ultimately accumulated
appeared unusually and alarmingly large.
Another feature has been the unusually large part
played by consumption goods in the decline; the
decrease in their production has been great and be-
gan before that' in other industries. Passenger auto-
mobiles were apparently the dominant factor in this
movement, at least in the earlier stages. This sug-
gests that we have an added problem to face in the
relative increase of durable consumers' goods, new
purchases of which at any given time are not in the
class of necessities but are highly postponable or op-
tional. Inventories in the hands of consumers thus
come to be more and more important; and we must
expect that an increasing length of time must elapse
before these inventories will be worn down to a point
at which new purchases will be required if the con-
sumer is to go on consuming. Though salesauto-
mobiles fell off enormously, it was not until 1931
thatthey fell clearly below what may be taken as a
normal replacement basis; thus indicating an actual
decrease in the number of normally effective cars in
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the hands of users; and even that did not mean that
the gross number of cars of all ages wasdecreasing.
A cursory survey of conditions tends to the con-
clusion that practically all possible factors conspired
to do their worst in the present depression; especially
the non-cyclical factors which appear to have marked
this as a phase of post-War disldcation even more
than a cyclical decline. There are, it is true, some
puzzles to confront in any such diagnosis. Construc-
tion, contrary to custom, was declining almost
throughout the up-swing of general business; while
stock exchange speculation, also contrary to custom,
continued to rise until after the beginning of gen-
eral recession. If one of these was an unfavorable
condition, was the other favorable? And if both
were unfavorable, how is this to be explained?
Probably the truth is that the particular timing
of these movements was not of so much importance,
especially as they tended to offset each other, as the
fact that both had gone beyond the usual degree of
expansion characterizing a typical cyclical up-swing.
The impetus from the speeding-up of construction
incident to making good the War-time shortage was
not exhausted in one cycle, and was prolonged by
the further stimulus of speculative building. And
as to the stock market, the continued rise in paper
values after the underlying productive processes had
slowed up caused in itself an unusual and unbal-
anced condition, tending to make the final crash
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worse. It meant to a considerable extent that the
usual adjustments to a slowing-up of production
were not made at the usual time.
Stock prices during the great boom were capitaliz-
ing not current earnings but future increases of a sort
which any systematic analysis should have revealed
as beyond all human possibility. The only other jus-
tification for such values would have been a radical
and enduring reduction of interest rates. But this
should have affected stocks and bonds alike, and the
rates on bonds and mortgages prevailing at the same
time showed no such radical decline as would have
been needed to rationalize the prices of stocks. What
was happening was a relative shift of demand, in
favor of speculative securities, out of all proportion
to the magnitude of ordinary shifts of this sort, carry-
ing values, relative to yields, to points far outside
what could be called normal, unless on the basis of
an expectation of future increase which no industrial
system could maintain. A person who appreciated
this fact might still have bought stocks in the hope
that the craze would last long enough to enable him
to sell out at a profit, leaving some other purchaser
to bear the inevitable disillusionment; but this
chology of 'after us the deluge' was not the one
which actually prevailed, and it could hardly have
accounted for the extravagant lengths to which the
boom was carried. Buyers who thought of the matter
at all were typically convinced that the country had
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entered upon a 'new era' in which deluges were not
to be permitted.
Non-Cyclical Factors: Post-War Conditions
The current depression is more than the end of
a business cycle of unusual severity. On the basis
of cyclical theory limited to the hypothesis of the
type of cycle averaging in this country three and a
third years, it is impossible fully to explain all its
characteristics—its small rise, enormous decline and
long-continued period of prostration. In part it may
furnish evidence, of a provisional sort, of the com-
bination of the shorter cycles with a longer cycle of
about three times the average duration of the shorter
ones. This longer cycle appears to rest in consider-
able part on the psychology of speculation, and on
the related factors of expansion of fixed capital and
of construction.
But these factors are themselves not unrelated
to another set of factors which are not cyclical at
all in any discoverable fashion: namely, the process
of post-War reconstruction and the dislocated condi-
tions of international finance and trade, which the
War left behind it. One legacy of the War was a
price structure which, even in 1921,hadpresumably
not completed its destined deflation. In this coun-
try, prices were still well above the pre-War level,
while the world at large had not returnedthe
gold basis. Along with this went a mal-distribution
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of the world's gold supply which left this country
with ample gold to sustain the post-War price level
without straining its credit machinery, while other
countries lacked a gold basis adequate to the re-
quirements that would be set up by resumption of
specie payment. As country after country resumed
specie payment, they took up the burden of sustain-
ing a volume of media of exchange adequate to the
current price level on a scant gold basis. Thus the
price level rested on an insecure foundation, and
what might be called the normal deflation was post-
poned. Any tendency to downward movements in
prices was further blocked at numerous points by
specific measures for sustaining the prices of nu-
merous particular commodities. This entire situation
meant weak currency and credit structures, which
must be protected against large gold movements;
while gold movements were called for by the War's
legacy of economically abnormal debts and the im-
possibility of paying them in commodities. Pallia-
tives such as short-time borrowing increased the
instability.
The result would have been to strip Europe of
gold completely, had it not been for a great flow of
loans from this country—a movement which in the
nature of the case could not go on forever. This we
can now see, though no one could predict in ad-
vance when or how the end would come. The case
was not like the former borrowings of the United
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States from Europe: borrowings which furnished
capital needed for the development of a virgin con-
tinent into the most productive area of the world.
These new loans back to Europe were made to a
weakened economy, in amounts beyond what was
directly productive. They were made by a country
unwilling to do what Europe had done when it was
our creditor: namely, accept payment in goods. Thus
there was doubt whether debtor economies would
bear the aggregate debt charges in addition to their
other burdens, and certainty that the creditor coun-
try would not accept real repayment if it could be
made. The movement of European funds into the
American stock market, lured by the boom, was an
aggravating circumstance. Ultimately the price struc-
turc broke and a catastrophic fall in world prices
followed. Later, credit structures also collapsed,
having been further weakened by the piling up of
perilously large volumes of international short-term
obligations. Thus pressures accumulated through a
period of years, and finally came to a head.
For the United States the post-War export of cap-
ital postponed for at least ten years the impact of
the new position of a creditor country in which the
War left us. To this new position we have not yet
begun to adjust our economy, or manifested any
real appreciation of the nature of the necessary ad-
justments or any willingness to make them. We con-
tinued apparently determined to go on selling goods
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abroad and unwilling to receive in return goods
which competed with our own products. And now
we stand helplessly contemplating the collapse of
this system and unable to face in any new direction.
Our tariff on competitive goods is nearly prohibi-
tive, and two-thirds of our imports consist of those
non-competitive goods which are left on the free
list. Under these conditions Europe can manifestly
not continue to take our products in the volume
essential to our existing plan of prosperity; but with
this fact we have not yet made our reckoning. This
represents a non-cyclical factor of vast importance,
both for the present and for the future.
Increase of Durable Goods
Another factor in the present situation, bearing
not merely on the existing crisis but also on the
probable character of future cycles, is the outcome
of our rising standard of living and especially the
increasing importance of durable consumers' goods.
As we have already seen, these changes result in a
great relative increase in the volume of purchases
which are optional and to a high degree postpon-
able, and hence peculiarly sensitive to changes in
the flow of current incomes and in the general state
of confidence.
A further complication is the fact that such pur-
chases are largely made on credit—indeed, the vol-
ume of credit used to finance such purchases appears
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to have been increasing faster than the volume of
this class of purchases, indicating an intensified in-
crease in the resort to credit.2 This credit is of a
longer-term sort than retailers' current accounts,
and is highly expansible because it is based on the
specific security of the particular goods bought. And
while credit may be more a passive and enabling
force than an active and initiating one, itis still
crucially important.
Any class of purchases made on this sort of credit
is one in which it is possible for current purchases
to move more or less independently of the volume
of current income derived from past acts of produc-
tion, and we have seen that durable goods are by
their nature predisposed to just such movements.
Such movements have a peculiar power to initiate
changes in the rate of production. This they could
not do if purchases must always equal income; in-
come in turn being made up of the financial pro-
ceeds of past acts of production. Once initiated,
changes in production return in the familiar cumu-
lative fashion to cause further changes in purchases.
Thus goods of this sort, bought in this way, are a
peculiarly disturbing element in our economic life.
.And because this element is increasing, it may well
2 This statement is based on a study of construction made for the
National Bureau of Economic Research, in cooperation with the Com-
mittee on Recent Economic Changes, by W. C. Clark and Miss victoria
Pederson; and on the growth of installment selling as reported in un-
published studies made for the National Bureau.
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be that, if no effective means off stabilization are
found, business cycles in this country are destined
to become progressively more severe in the future.
In this connection there is also the possibility that
the increasing volume of durable goods may lengthen
the time required for the using-up of inventories
in the hands of consumers, and thus cause one of the
forces of recovery to act more slowly. As a further
result of longer periods of subnormal production,
there may be more work to do, upop the revival of
demand, to bring supplies up to a' prosperity nor-
mal. The resulting expansion in these industries may
be either more violent or more prolonged, depend-
ing on how rapidly they can expand their output.
The outcome may take one of several forms:(1)
moreviolent expansions of general business,(2)
more prolonged expansions of general business, or
expansionsin these special industries lasting
over more than one short cycle of general business,
as the post-War construction boom did, thus tend-
ing toward an alternation of mild and severe cycles.
Possibly all three effects might appear at different
times, according to the special conditions prevailing.
Conditions Bearing on Recovery
The study of the special features of the present
depression seems to indicate that it may have ex-
tended past the point at which some of the usual
forces of automatic recovery can be expected to
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come into operation, largely because consumers' re-
serves became exhausted, while there was still a large
surplus of construction and capital equipment rela-
tive to the shrunken volume of purchasing power.
As a result, the prospect of recovery through the
usual automatic forces was no longer extremely
hopeful, and a search for more powerful and positive
measures was urgently indicated.
On the other hand, the trough of the depression
witnessed widespread hoarding, an abnormal restric-
tion of credit—abnormal even for a depression—and
a condition approaching panic on the part of banks
even before the general suspension of March,
Allthis gives some. ground for hope that if these
conditions can be overcome and an upward move-
ment once started, it may have cumulative effects of
the usual sort, and may even initiate the chain of
causes leading to a recovery as complete as the new
international conditions make possible. These new
international conditions, however, act as a bar to
the hope that we may quickly catch up with the
trend of 1922-29 and continue on a prolongation
of that upward movement. We cannot continue in-
definitely to finance a large export surplus with loans
3Thisand the following paragraph were originally written before
the inauguration of President Roosevelt and the general banking sus-
pension of March, 1933. The final opportunity for revision comes as
the Roosevelt recovery program is getting under way but too soon
for any considered estimate of its results. Therefore the original state-
ments have been allowed to remain.
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over and above the debt payments due us, and thus
maintain our industry in the happy state of working
both for the foreign and the domestic markets. That
particular vein of prosperity appears to be worked
out. Hence it seems highly improbable that the next
revival will reach the heights of 1928-29, whatever
may ultimately happen.
One further consequence of serious moment fol-
lows. Improvements in technique have been in-
stalled, or stand ready to be installed, which will
still further economize labor, and if total output
does not reach the level of the former peak, the next
revival cannot restore more than a part of- the em-
ployment which the present depression took away.
We shall have a large unemployment problem in
the winter of 1933-34,andthe following winter,
even if revival follows upon the efforts of the Roose-
velt administration and goes as far as any rational
forecast can conceive. This means that, even while
we face the immediate pressure to feed and shelter
the needy, and relegate 'long-range planning' to an
indefinite future, planning of an intermediate sort
is pertinent, practical and almost necessary: planning
for one, two and three years ahead. For example, a
coordination and extension of present local and
fragmentary schemes for enabling the otherwise un-
employed to produce for their own and one another's
needs under a system of barter or other interchange:
this might be a most practical undertaking.
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